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Abstract
The paper uses a case study of urban regeneration policy in Sheffield, UK, to explore local public
entrepreneurship in a system of multi-level governance. Recent analyses of public entrepreneurs
have directed attention to the macro-political structural and institutional conditions that enable
and constrain these actors, and to their individual characteristics and attributes. The stress has
been on the national level and on individual action at the expense of the agency of local networks
of entrepreneurs. In order to address this lacuna, we consider how local policy entrepreneurs
work across governance levels and develop ideas, institutional structures and support in pursuit of
their goals, using Kingdon’s notion of policy streams as a vehicle for our analysis. We highlight the
contingent and path-dependent nature of such entrepreneurship. In particular, we identify the
temporal sequencing of agenda shifts and entrepreneurial actions as a crucial aspect of the policy
process.
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Introduction
The dominant narrative of central–local government relations in the UK has been the power
of central government to make and remake the institutional landscape and, in so doing, to
erode the institutional cohesiveness, policy competences and autonomy of local political
institutions (c.f. Pratchett, 2004; Wilson, 2003). However, the past two decades have also
seen the advance of multi-level governance (MLG) (Keating, 2014) and increased
opportunities for ‘authority migration’ (Broschek, 2014) to institutional actors at supra-
and sub-national levels, allowing greater scope for the exercise of local autonomy. The
UK’s institutional regime is currently the subject of rapid restructuring. Examples of this
include the rise of city regions (c.f. Deas, 2014; Etherington and Jones, 2009; Harding, 2007;
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Harrison, 2010, 2012; Jonas and Ward, 2007) and institutional innovations such as
combined authorities and elected mayors. The implementation of these changes has been
selective.
The paper explores one explanation for this uneven distribution of powers: public
entrepreneurship. While the concept challenges institutionalism’s limited treatment of
institutional change, accounts often fail properly to locate the actions of entrepreneurs
within a context of MLG, restricting our understanding of how such a setting may enable
or constrain agency. In a multi-level polity – or more speciﬁcally, in policy ﬁelds that
incorporate institutional actors from many sites – numerous policy processes play out
across diﬀerent levels and are often misaligned. Within the UK, sub-national actors have
been ﬁrmly subordinate to actors at higher levels and the former are reliant on the latter for
resources to devise and implement policies. MLG is a potential alternative source of
mobilization by sub-national actors (Marshall, 2005, 2006). Successful entrepreneurship
thus depends on how well actors operate within and across governmental levels and the
ways in which particular policy ideas are perceived at particular junctures across these levels.
The paper examines the restructuring of the institutional regime governing central–local
relations. It presents a case study of Sheﬃeld’s entrepreneurial actions in the ﬁeld of urban
regeneration. The study demonstrates the importance of entrepreneurial activities, such as
lobbying, policy framing and institutional development, in producing institutional and
policy change within a system of MLG. However, while we acknowledge the importance
of entrepreneurial actions in explaining such change, we also point to the contingent and
path-dependent nature of such entrepreneurship. In particular, we identify the temporal
sequencing of agenda shifts across governmental levels as a crucial aspect of the policy
process. Overall then, we explore the dynamic relationship between strategic agency and
contingent opportunity structures.
The paper has three parts. First, we review the concept of public entrepreneurship,
drawing attention to the strategies available to entrepreneurs and to the institutional
constraints that limit action. In the second part, we analyze the latter by exploring the
implications of MLG from Kingdon’s (1995) multiple streams perspective. The third part
presents a case study of public entrepreneurship in Sheﬃeld. We describe how a policy for
regenerating the city centre was developed; how actors within the council fostered an elite
consensus in the city and how they engaged in brokerage, lobbying, and institution building
to obtain greater funding. We demonstrate the signiﬁcance of alignments of national and
European policy windows for public entrepreneurs working across levels of governance. We
conclude by considering the contingent nature of entrepreneurial activities, stressing that the
scope for entrepreneurial agency is tempered by complex interrelations between institutional
structures1 and agent-level factors.
Public entrepreneurialism in MLG
Variants of institutionalism – particularly of the historical or rational choice kind – have
been criticized for having only a weak account of how rapid institutional change occurs
(Weyland, 2008). Institutional lock-in is assumed to arise from path dependence or
dysfunctional equilibria, breaks from both of which are diﬃcult (Sheingate, 2014;
Weyland, 2008). Recently, more nuanced explanations have been developed of how
processes institutions change over time (Beland, 2007; Lewis and Steinmo, 2012; Orren
and Showronek, 2004; Thelen, 2004; Van der Heijden, 2011). However, the role of
individual agency within institutional and policy change remains weakly speciﬁed (Oborn
et al., 2011). Despite this, public entrepreneurs2 are seen as important inﬂuences on policy
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outcomes within MLG. They are a source of variation within policy subsystems and their
activities weaken or even undermine deterministic models of analysis (Schneider and Teske,
1993: 725). They disrupt the status quo by oﬀering policy solutions to extant but hitherto
neglected policy problems or by pursuing new policy initiatives.
For Ostrom (2005a: 1), public entrepreneurship ‘is a particular form of leadership focused
primarily on problem solving and putting heterogeneous processes together in
complementary and eﬀective ways’. Kingdon’s (1995: 204) inﬂuential perspective sees
policy entrepreneurship as a form of policy advocacy, with entrepreneurs conceived as
agents ‘willing to invest their resources in return for future policies they favor’ (Kingdon,
1995: 204). Whichever interpretation is adopted, the nature and actions of entrepreneurs
may be critical inﬂuences on institutional development and policy adoption and change
(Ostrom, 2005b). They are involved in various stages of the policy process, from
innovating and designing ideas to implementing or institutionalizing them (Roberts and
King, 1991: 150).
Political economists conceptualize public entrepreneurs in terms of market actors who are
‘alert’ to extant opportunities or opportunities that can be created within existing structures
(Holcombe, 2002; Schneider and Teske, 1993: 725; Schneider et al., 1995: 44, 48;
Wohlgemuth, 2000). Such actors anticipate changes already in development or seek to
generate them themselves or with others (see below). While proﬁt is the predominant
motive of private sector entrepreneurs, the drivers of public entrepreneurship are diﬀerent.
The primary aim of a politician may be reduced to vote maximization, but bureaucratic and
executive entrepreneurs are generally claimed to have more dispersed and ambiguous
motivations. They may wish to advance the ‘public interest’ or they may focus on more
direct organizational imperatives, such as increasing or diversifying their funding streams
(Perkmann, 2007: 867) to gain greater autonomy and less uncertainty for their organizations
(Carpenter, 2001; Klein et al., 2010; Lowndes, 2005). Entrepreneurial activities are hence
likely to occur in response to changes in the external environment, such as ‘. . .basic
knowledge, available technologies, social conditions, or performance of the existing
repertoire of private and public institutions’ (Oliver and Paul-Shaheen, 1997: 747–748; see
also Morris and Jones, 1999; Zerbinati and Souitaris, 2005). But personal motivations such
as career enhancement may also inﬂuence behaviour (Bernier and Hafsi, 2007: 490).
The unit of analysis for public entrepreneurship ranges from the individual up to the
organizational or even inter-organizational level. Early studies of entrepreneurship were
focused on the actions of heroic ‘individuals who change the direction and ﬂow of
politics’ (Schneider and Teske, 1992: 737). But such a role could also be performed by
groups or teams within organizations (Morris and Jones, 1999: 73; Phillips and Tracey,
2007: 315; Teixeria and Silva, 2012: 335; Wenger, 1998), or entire organizations that are
trying to win advantage across levels of governance (see Hederer, 2007; Perkmann, 2007;
Roberts and King, 1996). A more organization-focused approach to entrepreneurship
underscores the importance of group learning (Roberts and King, 1996: 165) and the
succession of entrepreneurial actors over time. Oliver and Paul-Shaheen (1997: 746)
describe public entrepreneurship as an ‘internal team process’ whereby policies are
developed by weaving existing ideas together rather than by appropriating a prototype
oﬀered by external policy entrepreneurs.
While public entrepreneurs are similar to economic entrepreneurs in some respects – for
example, opportunity recognition, risk taking, networking and social skills, reputation,
providing a strategic vision, and so on – actors within state structures operate in
fundamentally diﬀerent institutional contexts (Carpenter, 2001; Christopoulos, 2006;
Fligstein, 2001; Hederer, 2007; Scnellenbach, 2007). They face a number of distinct
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obstacles. Their activities are governed by political and electoral cycles and are subject to
other forms of political interference (Morris and Jones, 1999: 79). They are also confronted
with a fragmented system of governance, which oﬀers both challenges and opportunities. In
a system of MLG, resources are distributed between many actors. As issues grow more
complex ‘we expect [entrepreneurial] groups to supplant individuals as the primary unit of
analysis’ (Roberts and King, 1996: 162). In this context, (individual) leadership involves
brokerage across governance levels, fostering the development of innovative ideas within
organizations and ‘setting priorities, undertaking interorganizational initiatives where
appropriate, and encouraging and rewarding actors for their contributions’ (Bernier and
Hafsi, 2007: 494). Our case study illustrates this interaction between individual and group
public entrepreneurship.
Entrepreneurial strategic action at the local level
Local-level public entrepreneurs engage in numerous activities that resemble those of
economic actors: institutional strategy making, opportunity discovery/recognition and
anticipatory action (i.e. timing), as well as advocacy and/or brokerage (Pollitt, 2008: 127;
Roberts and King, 1991: 148). Public entrepreneurs hence engage in forms of institutional
bricolage, drawing together resources from diverse sources to produce unexpected results
(Lowndes, 2005; Lowndes and Roberts, 2013; Phillips and Tracey, 2007). They may seek to
mobilize collaborative action around their policy, which may help to resolve collective action
problems (Bernier and Hafsi, 2007; Franc¸ois, 2003; Hederer, 2007; Holcombe, 2002; Ostrom,
1990; Schneider and Teske, 1992).
Local-level public entrepreneurs employ numerous, often complementary strategies.3
First, they may try to change the ‘rules of the game’, by creating or implementing ‘new
laws, administrative procedures, informal norms’ (Klein et al., 2010) and other forms of
lobbying (Klein Woolthuis et al., 2013). They may also engage in institution building
(Bernier and Hafsi, 2007; Lewis, 1980; Perkmann, 2007) or institutional transformation
(Fligstein, 1997). This entails constructing formal and informal networks or
organizational structures (e.g. building bureaus) (Roberts and King, 1991: 151).
Entrepreneurs may also seek to engage in institutional adaptation, conversion and
layering or recombination (Beland, 2007; Thelen, 2004; Van der Heijden, 2011).
Beyond formal institutions, entrepreneurs may try to mediate ideas and discourses within
and between policy communities across tiers of government and epistemic communities
(Bakir, 2009; Broschek, 2014). Entrepreneurs can engage in discursive agenda setting by
seeking to frame policy debates around particular ideas (Beland, 2007; David, 2015;
Schmidt, 2010). For example, they may try to build a coalition and facilitate cooperation
around a speciﬁc vision (Carpenter, 2001; Klein Woolthuis et al., 2013: 94). Alternatively, as
Keddie and Smith (2009) emphasize, subnational actors may seek to inﬂuence policy
agendas at higher levels of government by oﬀering alternative formulations of the
problem–policy relationship (policy images, pace Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). Finally,
they may engage in ‘venue shopping’ (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993) for their favoured
ideas: a search across levels of governance for the most receptive arena within which to
pursue their policy objectives (c.f. Beyers and Kerremans, 2012; Coen and Thatcher, 2008;
Guiraudon, 2000; Kern and Bulkeley, 2009; Princen and Kerremans, 2008). While a
particular policy image may be accepted in one venue, it may be rejected in another,
aﬀecting the success of a policy initiative (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993: 31–32).
Public entrepreneurs hence work across levels of governance, seeking to shift and/or frame
policy images which resonate with the preoccupations of relevant institutional actors
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(see Bakir, 2009; Beeson and Stone, 2013; Daviter, 2009; Oborn et al., 2011; Riker, 1986).
They try to build coalitions around their framing(s) and engage in lobbying strategies to
achieve their objectives (David, 2015; Klein Woolthuis et al., 2013). Successful
entrepreneurs are likely to have ‘political know-how’ and ‘persistence’ (Beeson and Stone,
2013: 4).
Recent analyses of public entrepreneurs have directed attention to the macro politico-
institutional conditions that enable and constrain these actors, as well as to their individual
characteristics and attributes (Christopoulos, 2006; Pierson, 2004: 155; Scnellenbach, 2007).
What has been given less attention is the potential agency of local networks of entrepreneurs
within a system of MLG. In order to address this lacuna, we focus on the relationships that
enable and inhibit entrepreneurship. In particular, we consider how local-level public
entrepreneurs – both individuals and groups – work across institutional levels and weave
together agendas, institutions and policy at a local level (see also Lowndes, 2005: 305).
Because of the complexity of this institutional setting, we use Kingdon’s (1995) notion of
policy streams as a vehicle for our analysis of this aspect of MLG.
Policy streams and MLG
Within MLG, urban governance is an important intersection where competing policy
preferences, styles and processes must be integrated by local actors to produce coherent,
implementable policies. However, the greater interconnectedness of policy networks does not
mean that policy goals are shared. Diﬀerences between actors’ interests and priorities, and
between problem deﬁnitions and solutions, may exist (Kokx and Van Kempen, 2010). It is
here that local public entrepreneurs are important, but their scope for action is aﬀected by
the opportunities and constraints posed by operating in a system of MLG.
In trying to understand how policy agendas are formed, Kingdon (1995) sought to avoid the
reiﬁcation of policy problems and speciﬁed a logical (temporal) ordering for how these problems
are addressed. There is an excess of issues that could conceivably be the subject of policy, yet few
can receive attention. This led Kingdon to set out three ‘policy streams’ that may inﬂuence the
selection, deﬁnition, development, sorting and matching of problems and policies.
1. Problems: Flowing through the ‘problem’ stream is a series of ‘conditions’ that policy
makers want to address. However, not all conditions become problems (Zahariadis,
2007: 71). Some issues are not considered problems until they are perceived as such
by policy makers when indicators (e.g. school league tables, murder rates,
unemployment ﬁgures) are published and political entrepreneurs, academics, interest
groups or the media (among others) frame the issue as a ‘problem’, explain its causes
and, thereby, make it actionable.
2. Policies: In this stream, various ideas for resolving social problems are generated by
policy specialists operating in policy communities (including academics, think tanks,
bureaucrats, etc.). It is here that policy entrepreneurs (see below) are active. Adopting
an evolutionary perspective on policy development, Kingdon (1995) argues that
emerging policies will only be adopted if they ﬁt with dominant values and the
national mood, attain political support (or avoid opposition), prove technically
feasible and are aﬀordable.
3. Politics: This stream consists of factors such as changes in government or legislation, the
eﬀects of interest group lobbying and changes in national mood. Exworthy et al. (2002:
84) state that these factors ‘are inﬂuenced by bargaining, consensus building, coalitions
and compromises’.
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Kingdon argued that these three streams, while not completely autonomous, have a
degree of independence until they are ‘coupled’ when a policy window opens. It is at this
point that choice is made in a political system. Such opportunities may be prompted by – or
prompt – ‘focusing events’ or the actions of public entrepreneurs. While there may be no
shortage of potential entrepreneurs in a policy environment, their success is contingent on a
mix of connections, negotiating skills and expertise (Oborn et al., 2011: 328).
Kingdon’s insights were originally focused on the Congress and the apex of the American
political system. The past decade has seen an increased interest in adapting and applying
Kingdon’s insights to levels beyond central government.4 For example, Exworthy et al.
(2002) in their analysis of health policy within the UK demonstrate that policy windows
open (and close) independently at central and local levels of government. Such accounts
argue against simplistic top-down analyses of policy formation, oﬀering the potential for
local-level actors to inﬂuence the development of policy agendas (see also Exworthy and
Powell, 2004; Greenaway et al., 2007: 723–724; Oborn et al., 2011; Petchey et al., 2008).
Applied to public entrepreneurship within MLG, success in changing the policy agenda is
more likely when the three policy streams are joined across three institutional dimensions:
‘the vertical (central-local) dimension; the central horizontal dimension and the horizontal
(local-local) dimension’ (Exworthy and Powell, 2004: 268–269; and the European level of
policy introduces added complexity). Oborn et al. (2011: 328) note that the complexity of
multiple policy streams across MLG means that a coalition of entrepreneurs is required
spanning diﬀerent levels. Similarly, we argue that local actors can be more than shapers of
policy handed down from above, but to a degree that is dependent on the entrepreneurial
skills of such actors. We therefore examine the capacity for local public entrepreneurs to
operate ‘strategically within a system which oﬀers a range of possible locations to pursue
their objectives’ (Laﬃn, 2009: 24).
The empirical base of this paper is a case study of Sheﬃeld City Council. Sheﬃeld was
chosen because it is a local authority that has successfully developed novel regeneration
policies and secured resources from a range of sources to fund them. It has been widely
cited in urban regeneration and planning practice as an exemplar of entrepreneurial
leadership (Booth, 2005; Crouch and Scott Hill, 2004; Dabinett, 2004, 2005; Lyons
Report, 2007). This reputation has seen other cities in the UK seek to emulate its
approach to regeneration. This makes an examination of Sheﬃeld’s experience signiﬁcant,
not least because it demonstrates how its success was critically shaped by the timing of
agenda alignments across levels of governance.
Our research aim was to explore local agency within the context of MLG. The over-
arching research question was: ‘To what extent are local actors, in particular local
authorities, able successfully to coordinate diﬀerent policy frameworks following the
advance of MLG?’
To address the complex nature of this question, a semi-inductive (Eisenhardt, 1989),
grounded approach was adopted to construct a case study. Our goal was to understand
how actors developed a speciﬁc problem frame and then sought to mobilize resources for
action across multiple levels of government. We do not claim strong external validity for our
ﬁndings because our study was principally exploratory in nature, with the ﬁndings
contributing to theory building (Gerring, 2004; Stake, 1999; Yin, 2009: 17). The initial
focus was not on entrepreneurship or policy windows; these emerged as themes from our
interview data.
The case study draws upon interviews with more than 70 actors in Sheﬃeld and in
regional organizations over two phases: 2002–4 and 2008–9. The interviewees were
identiﬁed via a mixture of purposive (selecting individuals on the basis of their
6 Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 0(0)
organizational role, such as directors of regeneration), chain-referral (‘snowball’) and
convenience approaches (Kapiszewski et al., 2015; Lynch, 2013). The lead researcher used
his judgement when he felt that saturation point had been reached. The interviewees
included actors in the local authority (including leading members of the council from the
Labour and Liberal Democrat parties; the then Chief Executive, Bob Kerslake; and other
senior Council oﬃcers and members), businessmen, community representatives from across
the voluntary sector and oﬃcers from the then Government Oﬃce for Yorkshire and
Humber, the Regional Development Agency (Yorkshire Forward), and the South
Yorkshire Objective 1 Directorate. Interviews varied in length (the shortest lasted 40min,
the longest over 3 h). The interviews took place at the oﬃces of the individuals being
interviewed.
All the interviews were recorded, transcribed and analyzed to identify common themes
and emerging issues, prior to further analysis and interpretation (see Charmaz, 2001; Guest
et al., 2012). The study was also informed by analysis of policy documents from European,
national, regional and local levels such as programme documents, local ‘vision’ documents,
strategies and plans. Our data analysis strategy was similar to that adopted by Oborn et al.
(2011), which was to utilize applied thematic analysis to identifying the existence of policy
windows and the actions of entrepreneurs. Consistent with a grounded theory approach,
open, axial and selective coding techniques were employed to begin the process of labelling
phenomena, developing categories and assembling data in new ways after coding, before
then establishing connections between categories (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). Axial coding
helped establish the context and causal conditions while selective coding established the ﬁnal
key themes.
The ﬁndings from the initial phase of research were presented to practitioners (including
the key public entrepreneur, Kerslake, at a dissemination event in 2007 before the second
round of interviews commenced). This enabled the researchers to consider the reliability of
the initial ﬁndings.
Regenerating the heart of the steel city
The problem: City centre decline
As part of its response to post-industrial decline, Sheﬃeld sought to foster closer links with
the private sector through public–private partnerships (Harding, 1991) after a period of
radical policy experimentation in the early 1980s (see Catney, 2009; Lawless, 1990; Seyd,
1990). This reconciliation between public and private actors was reﬂected in various
institutional innovations, the ﬁrst being the Sheﬃeld Economic Regeneration Committee
(SERC), established in 1987. SERC was comprised of representatives from the local
authority, the private sector, trade unions, higher education and the regional oﬃces of
government departments. In response to the ﬁnancially disastrous World Student Games,
the then Leader of the City Council, Mike Bower, pushed for further collaboration through
the launch of the City Liaison Group (CLG) in 1992 (see DiGaetano and Lawless, 1999:
563–569; Henry and Paramio-Scalcines, 1999: 648–649). Compared with SERC, the CLG,
while still led by the City Council, was more of a genuine partnership with the private sector.
The signiﬁcance of these institutional developments was that they facilitated the construction
of a coalition within the city in pursuit of a pro-growth policy agenda. More concretely, it
was through the CLG that the idea of a strategic masterplan for the city centre would be
adopted (see below). Analytically, SERC and CLG were examples of early forms of
institutional entrepreneurship and were forums within which ideas and support for
regeneration focused on the city centre could be cultivated.
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The emphasis on property-led regeneration by the UK national government was to play
an important – if unintentional – part in (re)deﬁning the ‘problem’ of city centre regeneration
in Sheﬃeld. The creation of an Urban Development Corporation (UDC) in the late 1980s
was of particular signiﬁcance.5 Initially, relations between Sheﬃeld City Council and its
UDC were problematic because the Council felt that it was being undercut by an
unelected quango inserted into local development by a hostile national (Conservative)
government (Booth, 2005). Consequently, Sheﬃeld Development Corporation’s (SDC)
initiatives were not properly embedded in city-wide regeneration plans. In particular, the
»240m invested in the Meadowhall shopping development, which opened in 1990,
accelerated the decline of the city centre’s retail sector (Lawless, 1994: 1307). This
presented the nascent CLG with a clear problem to address: the decline of the city centre.
An early response to this problem was the Sheﬃeld Central Area Study, which analyzed
the retail and oﬃce base of the city, in 1992 (Lawless, 1994) and was sponsored by the City
Council and the Sheﬃeld Chamber of Commerce. Later, in 1994, the Council and the SDC
commissioned a retail study that informed the revision of the Sheﬃeld Unitary Development
Plan. Both studies argued that Sheﬃeld’s growth was hampered by an inadequate supply of
modern retail and oﬃce space and that the city centre had failed to secure its share of new
investment (Sheﬃeld City Council, 2002). Their ﬁndings were crucial in shaping the
deﬁnition of the problem and solution in Sheﬃeld: that to promote economic growth it
was necessary to redevelop the city centre. However, the Council did not have the
resources to do this. A clearly worked out policy that addressed this key issue had to be
developed by policy entrepreneurs in Sheﬃeld.
The policy: City centre regeneration
The concept of an integrated regeneration strategy, called the ‘Heart of the City’, was
developed by actors within the urban development team of the City Council in 1994. Its
focus – to stimulate economic regeneration through a comprehensive city-centre
redevelopment strategy– was initially met with scepticism by political actors and senior
managers within the council, not least because it came only a few years after the
ﬁnancially crippling investment in the World Student Games in 1991 (see Henry and
Paramio-Scalcines, 1999). One former council oﬃcer (interview, 2008) outlined the
reaction of senior oﬃcers and politicians:
We showed it [an outline proposal for the scheme] to senior members and they said to me ‘‘Who
gave you permission to think of this?’’ [. . .] because they were frightened. Conﬁdence was at rock
bottom, the city was virtually bankrupt, they weren’t interested in any big scale schemes. So they
said to us ‘‘You can do it [Heart of the City] as long as it doesn’t cost us any money. You can
spend everybody else’s money, but none of ours,’’ which is not a very easy sell to outside funders.
To develop the concept the City Council again engaged in institution building, establishing a
special purpose body called the Sheﬃeld Development Agency, a small group operating within
the local authority. In conjunction with the SDC, it produced A New City – Sheﬃeld’s City
Centre Strategy, a report which put forward the concept of a comprehensive city centre
focused redevelopment strategy (Webster and Howard, 1996). In many respects, the work
of these actors anticipated the development of urban regeneration companies (URCs, see
below). The concept of the ‘Heart of the City’ underpinned Sheﬃeld’s bid (SCC, 1995) to
the second round of the National Lottery-funded Millennium Commission grant scheme. The
city was awarded »20.5 million in 1997 in contrast to its ﬁrst round bid that was rejected for
being ill-deﬁned and speculative (Webster and Howard, 1996).
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A key group of public entrepreneurs in the early stages of the initiative was the
Council’s City Development Agency. It identiﬁed three projects for the ﬁrst phase: the
Peace Gardens, the Millennium Galleries and the Winter Gardens. These developments
would create a high-quality public realm and support the ‘re-branding’ of the city.
However, the supply of ﬁnance necessary to meet the scale of these ambitions was
lacking. Between 1995 and 1997, apart from the Millennium Commission grant,
Sheﬃeld obtained only relatively small-scale funding from national sources such as the
Single Regeneration Budget to support initial development work.6 However, the Council
was concerned that the discrete, ad hoc nature of such monies would inhibit an
ambitious integrated development scheme for the whole city centre and risk a
reversion to isolated, small-scale projects. Public entrepreneurs within the city needed
an individual who could lead and co-ordinate their activities and enter ‘the market for
ﬁnancial funds’ (Hederer, 2007: 10), brokering agreements with an array of actors across
governance levels.
The politics: Exploiting a window of opportunity
In 1997 two critical events occurred. In April, Sheﬃeld City Council appointed a new Chief
Executive, Bob Kerslake, and a month later the (New) Labour Party came to power at
Westminster. These changes in the local and national ‘politics streams’ created the
potential for aligning policy windows at both levels and, ultimately, they played a decisive
role in Sheﬃeld’s regeneration strategy. We analyze these developments in turn.
Leadership and consensus building. Interviewees from across the public, private and voluntary
sectors agreed that it was Kerslake’s leadership that provided the focus around which all the
various initiatives could be related. The co-ordination of urban policy in the city was
essentially delegated to him and his oﬃcers. Kerslake was an eﬀective boundary spanner
and consensus builder at the local level and in national policy networks. Apart from being
the Chief Executive, Kerslake had many other roles in the city region, including those of
director of the sub-regional passenger transport executive, vice chair of the Sheﬃeld local
strategic partnerships (LSPs) and member of South Yorkshire Partnership. Nationally, he
also became a non-executive Board member at the Department for Communities and Local
Government.7
Kerslake’s ability to act as a public entrepreneur was, however, contingent on the
support of politicians on the City Council. Interviewees pointed to the importance of
the Labour Leader Jan Wilson’s support for Kerslake’s activities, given the reservations
of some Labour Members (Catney, 2009). Following the fall of the Labour
administration in the city, the leader of the Liberal Democrats on the council also
supported the emerging policy agenda and institution building within the city. A
number of interviewees (including Liberal Democrat councillors) stated that the
strategy was maintained in part because of central government policy pushes, but also
because of Kerslake’s close association with the project. A community activist in the city
supported this view (interview, 2008):
[. . .] it’s easy to say with hindsight that he did more what government wanted, but that’s where
you get your resources from. If he hadn’t, you know, there’d have been no money and he
wouldn’t have been able to do anything. I mean I have heard criticisms that he was in charge
of running the council and not elected members. [. . .] but, you know, I remember Jan Wilson
saying to me ‘‘Well, he brings home the bacon,’’ you know.
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Kerslake was generally considered to have three key qualities. First, he was a modernizer of
the local authority and signiﬁcantly altered the structure and staﬀ of the City Council. One
senior business actor in the city (interview, 2008) argued:
The inﬂuence of Bob was incredible in turning the council round from a pretty dull, inward
looking, dying organisation that was skint into a much. . . [better] functioning organisation, a lot
better, but also much more attuned to regeneration and there’s been quite a culture change. [. . .]
Bob’s leadership and, you know, one or two other people around within the city . . . was
absolutely vital.
Second, he strengthened the elite consensus within the city around the development agenda,
essentially depoliticizing regeneration. Third, he built central government conﬁdence by
working across government levels. A broad sweep of interviewees pointed to Kerslake’s
importance in providing leadership. Indeed, the quality of local leadership provided from
Sheﬃeld City Council had an important inﬂuence on the eﬀectiveness with which these
initiatives and governmental units were woven together, as the ﬁnal evaluation of
Sheﬃeld One made clear (Evans et al., 2007: para 11.43 and 11.44). In Sheﬃeld, the
engagement of organizations such as English Partnerships, Yorkshire Forward, Network
Rail and so on, was essential in providing the resources necessary for the successful delivery
of a complex set of redevelopment projects. Interviewees described the key role played by
Kerlsake in creating a strong sense of trust between network participants.
The successful delivery of regeneration projects in the city resulted in the growth in the
conﬁdence of both the public and private sectors. This conﬁdence was part of a positive
feedback cycle which reinforced the policy agenda and strengthened the linkages between
levels of governance. As the projects took shape, Yorkshire Forward and other public
organizations started to have more faith in the ability of the city to deliver its increasingly
ambitious agenda for the city, particularly with regard to public realm improvements
(interview, councillor, 2008).
In essence, Kerslake assumed the role of a ‘credible’ local public entrepreneur (Schneider
and Teske, 1993: 725). Sheﬃeld’s policy had already been developed by a group of
entrepreneurs before Kerslake’s arrival. However, these actors lacked resources. The
extent to which Kerslake and Sheﬃeld City Council were successful in drawing down
resources from other levels of government is a critical factor here. Sheﬃeld proved adept
at anticipating (and partially shaping) national regeneration policy and then at exploiting
opportunities at supra-local levels as they arose. It is to these activities that we now turn.
New labour and the ‘Urban Renaissance’. Developing a local policy consensus and building
institutions only goes so far in explaining Sheﬃeld’s success. Without a change in the
national politics stream, it is unlikely that the scale of the regeneration achieved in the
city would have been possible. The election of Tony Blair’s Labour government provided
a window within which to align local/national/supra-national policy. Labour was committed
to regenerating Britain’s cities, particularly what was termed the ‘core cities’8 most of which
were in the party’s heartlands. But the focus on cities was not simply a political calculation
but was part of broader policy learning about cities’ contribution to national economic
competitiveness. National government under Labour was extremely receptive to a policy
image that advocated large-scale and concentrated investment in cities.
The change in the policy image was evident at both national and European levels by 1999.
It was in that year that the Urban Task Force (DETR, 1999) recommended the development
of URCs to spearhead regeneration. Its report integrated strands of thinking inside
government and parts of the regeneration community (both academic and practitioner)
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about the physical (re)development of city centres, something with which the actors in the
City Council were fully attuned. The proposal to establish URCs dovetailed with the
emerging policy practice in Sheﬃeld where the focus on city development and partnership
structures was already emerging (see above and Catney, 2009). As one senior council oﬃcer
(interview, 2008) stated:
I think like many of those things it’s all in the timing, I suppose. The ﬁrst catalyst was the new
Labour government had come in and it commissioned Richard Rogers to do a report – you
know, the urban renaissance task force [. . ..] and that recommended area based [. . .] dedicated
bodies and the city was already fairly content with that sort of model because the city had
realised probably a number of years. . . well, quite a few years before. . . (emphasis added)
Sheﬃeld One was launched in February 2000 as one of three initial URCs. For Sheﬃeld,
it was a natural extension of the work undertaken by the CLG and the Sheﬃeld
Development Agency. The URC was essentially a partnership between Sheﬃeld City
Council, English Partnerships and Yorkshire Forward. There was also signiﬁcant private
sector representation on the board. It had a ﬁxed life of seven years. Its remit was to
concentrate resources on the redevelopment of the city centre and to integrate
regeneration activities, an approach Sheﬃeld had been advocating for several years.
Sheﬃeld One worked with already established themes and initiatives in the city (such as
the ‘Heart of the City’) developed by the City Council and, successively, SERC, the CLG
and the Sheﬃeld City Development Agency (SCDA). Consequently, there was a substantial
degree of continuity in the city’s agenda; an agenda that had anticipated shifts in national
government policy.
One of the ﬁrst acts of Sheﬃeld One was to commission a baseline study of local economic
conditions (property markets, transport, land use and so on), from which a ‘Masterplan’ was
developed in conjunction with the City Council. The plan, launched in February 2001,
focused on the implementation of a series of strategic projects that became known as the
‘magniﬁcent seven’9 (Evans et al., 2007: para. 1.9). Its lineage – building on the City Centre
Strategy of 1994 and the ‘Heart of the City’ – was clear. The Masterplan provided the
framework for the regeneration of the city centre over the next decade and beyond. In
terms of public entrepreneurship, the masterplan was helpful in building the conﬁdence of
the private sector and performed a useful function as a marketing device (Evans et al., 2007:
para. 3.22), as well as providing a similar role within state organizations.
. . .with some justiﬁcation, Sheﬃeld was [considered] a bit of a butterﬂy. You know, sort of ‘‘Can
we have money for this? Can we have money for that?’’ and what the Masterplan did – all the
masterplans do – is set out a coherent picture. (Senior manager, Sheﬃeld One, interview, 2008)
Sheﬃeld’s anticipation of changes in national policy10 and its exploitation of the
opportunities that subsequently arose were not entirely serendipitous. The ﬁrst
regeneration minister in the Labour government was a Sheﬃeld MP, Richard Caborn,
who provided signals to local public entrepreneurs that enabled Sheﬃeld to anticipate and
to inﬂuence national policy:
Richard’s oﬃce was right next to Sheﬃeld City Development Agency’s oﬃce [. . .] and he used to
tell us what was going on and obviously he contacted the city council and he said ‘‘This is the big
thing and we want to be going for it,’’ and we were saying the same thing. (Senior council oﬃcer,
2009)
Entrepreneurial success is greatly aided by recruiting inﬂuential insiders who are involved in
agenda building (Oliver and Paul-Shaheen, 1997). Here, the insider helped local actors by
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providing information on the direction of national governmental agendas and the potential
opportunities that might arise for the city. But Sheﬃeld also beneﬁted from the activities of
the lobbying of the Core Cities network, which kept the interests of cities like Sheﬃeld on the
policy agenda. Public entrepreneurship was not, however, an activity conﬁned to central–
local relations; the European level was also an important focus of Sheﬃeld’s activities.
Objective 1: A European policy window opens. In the late 1990s a second supra-local window
opened at the European level at the same time that local institution building and shifts in
policy agendas were taking place. In July 2000, the European Union designated South
Yorkshire as an area qualifying for Objective 1 structural funds. Over a six-year period,
the sub-region would receive »700 million. Sheﬃeld’s city centre was identiﬁed as an engine
of growth for the wider region. It was given its own Objective 1 measure (‘Measure 28’) and a
funding allocation of around »35 million (Sheﬃeld One, 2001: 3) to stimulate investment and
to create regional competitiveness and growth through support for major capital projects in
the city centre. Several interviewees claimed that Measure 28 was the result of the European
Union’s receptivity to Sheﬃeld’s framing of the city centre as the core of the sub-region’s
economy.11
. . .if your city centre, which is your biggest, single economic driver, isn’t driving, then by default
your city and your city regions are not going to perform as well economically. That’s the
argument we were pushing and, interestingly, the European Commission were pushing that as
well. [. . .] Sheﬃeld had to ﬁght very hard for that within South Yorkshire and the European
Commission were saying on the early stuﬀ that had gone in to them, ‘‘But where’s your city
centre, your biggest economic driver?’’ and ‘‘You are ignoring it.’’ [. . .] that argument was
bought. (interview, regeneration oﬃcer, 2009; emphasis added)
There is also evidence in the Objective 1 negotiations that European and local actors
operated together to redeﬁne the policy image and persuade national government to
accept the measure:
At the same time [as we were working on the Sheﬃeld One Masterplan] we wrote an integrated
development plan, which was required by the Objective 1 programme, and we were successful in
persuading Brussels. . . In fact, in some ways it was Brussels persuading the UK government that
we should have a dedicated measure for Sheﬃeld centre itself. (Senior regeneration manager,
Sheﬃeld City Council, 2008)
This echoes Princen and Kerremans’ (2008: 1139–1140) insight that ‘. . .political actors can
‘‘jump scales’’ by constructing a new scale for a given issue. In doing so, they [. . .] open new
opportunities for themselves . . .’ A similar redeﬁnition of the policy image took place within
the Objective 1 programme to the beneﬁt of Sheﬃeld. In short, a signiﬁcant aspect of
Sheﬃeld’s success was its ability to exploit the opportunities oﬀered to align European,
national and local policy images in the policy window that opened in 1997–2000. As a
result of the local public entrepreneurs’ activities, Sheﬃeld One was able to draw funding
from Objective 1 and use it in conjunction with capital funding from Yorkshire Forward and
various other sources: a form of entrepreneurial bricolage.
However, the EU was not just a source of ﬁnance. Objective 1 allowed Sheﬃeld to be
more innovative and adventurous in its approach to urban design and regeneration in the
city centre.
. . .some of the things we’ve done around public realm we had more support from our European
colleagues who saw the beneﬁt of that, knowing what had been done in other European cities,
12 Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 0(0)
than we did necessarily from UK bodies who were very reluctant to think money should go into
public spaces – because [they would ask] ‘‘where’s the direct economic output from doing X
square’’? (senior regeneration manager at Sheﬃeld City Council, interview, 2008)
Objective 1’s role was widely acknowledged by interviewees as crucial to the success of the
regeneration of the city centre. In the early phases, Objective 1 (as well as National Lottery and
Single Regeneration Budget) funding was critical in providing support for projects where the
private sector felt that the investment risks were too high (Evans et al., 2007: 3.31).
2008–2010: The closing of policy windows. In pursuing their activities, public entrepreneurs
within the city were conscious that the window of opportunity to align local, national and
European policy was temporary. This reinforced their desire to coordinate funding streams
in support of city centre redevelopment in an eﬀective and timely way. The opening and
closing of policy windows is not always obvious and is sometimes only evident after the fact.
The ending of some opportunities – such as the termination of a speciﬁed funding stream like
Objective 1 – is predictable (Howlett, 1998). The closing of other windows by economic and
political factors is more diﬃcult to foresee. The credit crunch, the subsequent recession and
the change to a Coalition government in 2010 fundamentally altered the policy context.
And Sheﬃeld’s agenda changed.
Kerslake left the Council and Sheﬃeld One came to the end of its operational life in 2007.
The latter was replaced by a new city development agency, Creative Sheﬃeld, that framed
the problems of regeneration in the city more widely than its predecessor, both in terms of
geographical scale (it has a broader focus than just the city centre) and in terms of ‘solutions’
that focus more on the development of the skills of the local workforce and on
environmental sustainability.
Conclusion
Public entrepreneurship is a critical aspect of the explanation for variation in the policy
process because it reintroduces notions of agency into institutional theory where
equilibrium and path dependence have been stressed (Garud et al., 2007; Weyland,
2008). Public entrepreneurs operate reﬂectively and strategically within the governance
structures that frame their actions. They must be alert to opportunities: opportunities
presented by extant circumstances, opportunities to create new organizational structures,
opportunities arising from changes in the external environment and from preparation for
or anticipation of such changes. Public entrepreneurs work on the identiﬁcation of policy
problems, the development of policy solutions and their linkage in policy images that
attract political support and, hence, capture resources. However, such activities are not
in and of themselves suﬃcient to explain success. Agency must also be set within the
context of the wider structural and institutional context in which public entrepreneurs
are located (Sheingate, 2014). In the context of this paper, we have highlighted the
importance of MLG as a source of constraint but also of opportunity. Would-be public
entrepreneurs seeking to achieve policy change have to engage with actors and institutions
with diﬀerent ideas and interests to either champion a particular idea and/or
opportunistically await the coming of a particular idea’s time (pace Kingdon). Through
an adaption of Kingdon’s approach, it can be claimed that success is most likely when the
three policy streams are joined across vertical and horizontal dimensions between and
within local, regional, national and supra-national levels of governance (Exworthy and
Powell, 2004: 268–269).
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The institutional framework within the UK has traditionally strongly mitigated against local
agency. However, forms of public entrepreneurship can and do exist. Local entrepreneurs have
sought to build their institutions’ capacity and autonomy. But the success of such endeavours is
inﬂuenced by their timing. Entrepreneurial agents utilize the resources at their disposal to exploit
the opportunities oﬀered by the opening of policy windows (Mintron, 2000; Princen and
Kerremans, 2008: 1131). But the extent to which such endeavours are successful is to a large
degree contingent on the wider political and institutional context being amenable to the idea
being proﬀered; the ability of the same public/policy entrepreneur to exert inﬂuence can vary
considerably across time and diﬀerent policy issues (Beeson and Stone, 2013).
The paper describes how public entrepreneurshipwas exercised in Sheﬃeld over two decades.
The process was emergent and contingent but nevertheless demonstrates some fundamental
aspects of local policy agency. Within the local area, institutional layering was evident with the
development of local institutions such as SERC (1987), CLG (1992) and, especially, SCDA
(1994), which paved the way for Sheﬃeld One (2000), a pathﬁnder URC. Similarly, Sheﬃeld
One’sMasterplan (2001) was based upon the SCDA’s ‘Heart of the City’ proposals that were, in
turn, underpinned by a consensus for city centre regeneration between political and business
elites and senior bureaucrats (a local–local action initiated by CLG). Thus, the groundwork was
undertaken by a group of local policy entrepreneurs. However, the installation of an eﬀective
individual public entrepreneur (Kerslake) was essential for further progress.
Most studies of public entrepreneurship assume a top-down policy process and focus on
individual actors. Our analysis of Sheﬃeld demonstrates how agency was exercised by both
groups and an individual through anticipatory action, inter-organizational networking,
lobbying and the acquisition of knowledge through central government linkages. The
Sheﬃeld case illustrates the recursive nature of public entrepreneurship: The city’s success
in deﬁning a clear, widely accepted policy image, in building institutions and in accessing
funds facilitated further rounds of eﬀective action as national government actors’ conﬁdence
grew in the capability of Sheﬃeld’s local institutions. It also demonstrates how public
entrepreneurs may exploit the European perspective to shape the prevailing policy image
in a way that ﬁts with their own strategic goals. Public entrepreneurship has elements that
are reﬂective and strategic, on the one hand, and serendipitous and uncontrollable, on the
other. But without the former, the opportunities presented by the later may not be exploited.
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Notes
1. Recent institutional theory (e.g. Bakir, 2013) distinguishes between structures – the broader
contexts within which institutions and agents are embedded – and institutions – formal and
informal rules that guide the behaviour of agents through the logic of appropriateness and
instrumentality. In this paper, we adopt a simpler framework that focuses on agents’ actions
within (mainly formal) institutional/organizational structures.
2. Taxonomies have proliferated in the literature, reflecting the capacious nature of the concept.
Franc¸ois (2003) contrasts political entrepreneurs (politicians) with ‘state producers’
(bureaucrats) whereas Scnellenbach (2007) distinguishes between political entrepreneurs, who
are individuals who promote non-incremental changes in political paradigms, and policy
entrepreneurs, who are concerned with implementing novel policies. Roberts and King (1991:
151) distinguish between ‘policy entrepreneurs’, ‘political entrepreneurs’, ‘programme
entrepreneurs’, bureaucratic entrepreneurs’, ‘administrative and executive entrepreneurs’ and
‘issue entrepreneurs’. Campbell (2004) and Fligstein (1997), among others, add the term
‘institutional entrepreneurship’. These are important distinctions. In this paper, we focus on
‘bureaucratic’ or ‘executive’ entrepreneurs. However, for the sake of clarity, we use the general
term ‘public entrepreneurs’ throughout as an encompassing category as the lines between political
and policy entrepreneurship (and indeed political and bureaucratic motivation and action) are
often porous (see Bernier and Hafsi (2007: 491)).
3. It is important to stress that such strategies are rarely envisages in toto. Rather, strategies are
developed as part of an incremental process of trial and error or imitation.
4. There have also been attempts to extend the analysis to the European Union. For an overview, see
Ackrill and Kay (2011).
5. UDCs were single purpose agencies, financed by central government, with a remit that focused
upon the physical renewal of land and buildings. UDCs were given extensive planning, compulsory
purchase and financial powers to support site assembly and to promote investment in their areas.
6. Following Zerbinati and Souitaris (2005: 48) we see the targeting of national and European
funding sources as a form of entrepreneurism in a Schumpeterian sense: identifying, generating
and combining resources in a ‘new combination’.
7. After his departure from Sheffield and a period with the Homes and Communities Agency, he
became the Permanent Secretary for the Department of Communities and Local Government and,
in 2012, the Head of the Home Civil Service.
8. Sheffield, alongside seven other cities: Birmingham, Bristol, Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester,
Newcastle and Nottingham. During the late 1990s and early 2000s, these cities formed a
network that lobbied for more attention to be given by national government to England’s
leading urban centres outside London (Power et al., 2010: 161). The Core Cities group co-
produced the document ‘Cities, Regions and Competitiveness’ (2003) with the Regional
Development Agencies and several central government departments, which underscored the
importance of the regeneration of cities as a means of enhancing national competitiveness.
9. The Heart of the City, the New Retail Quarter, City Hall/Barker’s Pool, the Digital Campus in the
Sheaf Valley, Castlegate, Sheffield Station and an Integrated Transport Strategy (Evans et al.,
2007; Sheffield One, 2001: 1).
10. As well as creating a proto-URC before they became official policy, Sheffield had also
established a form of LSP (Sheffield First) in 1998, before it too became national
government policy. Sheffield First was developed in response to the proliferation of partnership
initiatives in the city and the Local Government Association’s New Commitment to Regeneration
initiative, in which the Labour government had shown an early interest. Mike Bower, then leader
of the City Council, led the creation of Sheffield First as he wanted to get Sheffield’s LSP in
place early in the hope that it would benefit the city’s chances of maximizing the amount of
regeneration funding it received from the new government’s developing urban policy agenda
(see Catney, 2009).
11. See Dabinett (2010) for a detailed analysis of South Yorkshire’s Objective 1.
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